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GENERAL EDITOR

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TUHFAT-AL-MUJĀHIDIN

TUḤFAT-AL-MUJĀHIDĪN

AN

HISTORICAL WORK

IN

THE ARABIC LANGUAGE

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

BY

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PREFACE

It seems almost unnecessary to state that the *Tuhfat-al-Mujāhidīn* has already been done into English by Lieut. M. J. Rowlandson so early as 1833 A.D.¹ But few books have fallen into oblivion as this one. Not only Arabists have almost forgotten this work, but the geographical information provided by it, has not been fully utilised in any scheme of study of the ancient seaports of Southern India, though, not infrequently, some passing reference to this work is made by scholars.

The translation now offered to the public was begun many years ago, but its progress was so retarded by difficulties of text and other causes that it could not be got out in a form ready for publication. During the visit of the present translator to England about three years ago, he had the opportunity to consult two other texts of the same work in the India Office Library, London, and collate his copy with them. Yet the text was not at all satisfactory in regard to the quotations from the Qurān and *Traditions* of the Prophet. Even a recent edition² of this work was published without the First Chapter which abounds in quotations from the Qurān and *Traditions*.

The translator first set himself to the task of examining the accuracy of the text pertaining to the First Chapter, with good and reliable editions of books on *Traditions* and also checked the references to the verses of the Qurān.

1. Lieut. M. J. Rowlandson, Cor. M.R.A.S., Persian Interpreter at the Head-quarters of the army, Fort St. George, translated the work into English. It was printed by J. L. Cox & Son, 75, Great Queen Street, London, for the Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, and sold by John Murray, Albemarle Street, and Parbury, Allen & Co., Leadenhall Street, London, 1833 A.D.

2. The Arabic text was edited by Ḥakīm Shamsullāh Qādirī, Hyderabad, Deccan, 1931.

Alongside of the difficulty in regard to the text of *Traditions*, the presence of a large number of place names, mostly of Dravidian origin, deterred the scholars from taking to the work wholeheartedly. These names are transliterated in Arabic in a singularly crude and obscure form in all the available copies in India and England, and their identification becomes very difficult. A familiar acquaintance with Dravidian languages and also with the geographical information supplied by the Arabic literature is absolutely necessary to arrive at proper conclusions in regard to the identification of these place names. Whatever the present translator has achieved in that direction, he owes it to the results of his study of the Arab geographers, and a large portion of his conclusions regarding place names would not have been possible without the information collected for the study mentioned above. In justification of these conclusions in the present book, the translator would refer the kind reader to his work *Arabs' Knowledge of Southern India*³ and especially the first chapter on *Geography*. These conclusions would not only give information about a place, whose original name has undergone a curious change in the mouths of Arab navigators and merchants and remained all these years a puzzle to scholars, but would, it is believed, promote further study to secure accuracy about the identification. No doubt mistakes might have crept in, but as far as the information at the translator's disposal and his ability to use it go, his identification about place names may be taken as fairly correct.

Now a few words may be said about the work. Although the *Tuhfat-al-Mujāhidīn*, is a brief narrative, it is remarkable for the information contained in it, and it constitutes an important addition to our knowledge of the geography of Southern India and the beginning of the Portuguese history in India. It gives us a clear picture of the earlier activities of the Portuguese in Malabar. As the account is now rendered into English, it is unnecessary to discuss or analyse the details here and it will be sufficient to note a few points.

The work consists of an Introduction and Four Chapters.

3. The work will be published shortly by the University of Madras.

The *Introduction* sets forth the reasons which led the author to compile this narrative, chiefly to stir up the Muslims into activity against the unbelievers who had invaded the territories of the Muslims and oppressed them.

The *First Chapter* deals with the merits of *jihād*, giving the verses of the Qurān and the sayings of the Prophet that relate to the rewards for those who engage themselves in holy war against unbelievers.

The *Second Chapter* gives an account of the first appearance of Islām in Malabar, and the growth of various prosperous seaports on the West Coast.

In the *Third Chapter*, the author enumerates the strange usages and customs of the Hindu inhabitants of Malabar and the treatment accorded to the Muslim subjects by the Hindu rulers.

After these three chapters, which comprise nearly half of the narrative, commences the *Fourth Chapter*. This portion is entirely historical giving an account of the Portuguese from the time of their first arrival in Malabar in 1498 A.D. right up to 1583 A.D. covering a period of about eighty-five years. The details contained in this chapter lead one to emphasise four features in particular.

Firstly, the Muslims, before the advent of the Portuguese, appear to have been in good condition, and they were treated by the Hindu rulers with great respect and consideration; secondly, as a result of the Portuguese competition, the Muslims lost their trade supremacy and were no longer the sole carriers of trade to the west; thirdly, the martial vigour of the Muslims began to decline along with their fervent faith; fourthly, the Portuguese influence became all powerful in due course.

Thus with the rise of the Portuguese influence, the prosperity of the Muslims declined. The Portuguese opposed the Muslims, reduced them to misery and treated them with contempt in almost every respect. The narrative reveals a base description of their behaviour towards the Muslims. But the enthusiasm of the Zamorin of Calicut, and his devotion to the cause of the Muslims

were always unbounded. He spared neither men nor money in fighting against the Portuguese, the inveterate foes of the Muslims. Amongst the Muslim rulers in the Deccan, on the other hand, there was lack of enthusiasm or affinity for the interests of their Muslim brethren, a fact much deplored by the author of this work. No doubt the Muslim sultāns of the period did come forward to fight against the Portuguese, but they did not make much progress.

Of Shaykh Zaynu'd-Dīn, the author of the *Tuhfat-al-Mujāhidīn*, very little is known. His full name is Shaykh Zaynu'd-Dīn, son of 'Abdu'l-'Azīz, son of Zaynu'd-Dīn, son of 'Alī, son of Aḥmad al-Ma'barī. The term al-Ma'barī indicates that his ancestors belonged to Ma'bar.

Ma'bar is an Arabic word used for the first time by Yāqūt (1179-1229) in his Geographical Dictionary, to denote the east coast of the Indian peninsula. It is not possible from the accounts of Yāqūt and other Arab geographers to locate exactly where, at what point, the east coast (Ma'bar) begins, and the exact area it comprises along that coast. Abul-Fidā says that Ma'bar begins at about three or four days' journey to the east of Kawlam (Quilon) and the first locality from the side of Manibār (Malabar) is Rās Kumhuri (Cape Comorin).⁴

Thus Ma'bar, the east coast of the Indian peninsula, seems to be the ancestral home of Shaykh Zaynu'd-Dīn. Aḥmad, his ancestor, appears to have been the original immigrant to Ma'bar. Evidently he gave himself the appellation *al-Ma'barī*⁵ when he began to move from place to place. Shaykh Zaynu'd-Dīn who is said to have lived in Ponani, Malabar district, also retained that title to suggest his ancestral home.

It appears from the work that Shaykh Zaynu'd-Dīn must have lived during the period of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh (1558-1580) whom the Shaykh selected as his patron. Ferishta, the celebrated historian of that period, who has a chapter on *The Mahomedans in Malabar* in

4. For detailed information on Ma'bar see my *Arabs' Knowledge of Southern India*, pp. 53-56.

5. The term means one who belongs to Ma'bar.

his book,⁶ says: "All the materials of the history of the Mahomedans of the Malabar coast that I have been able to collect, are derived from *Tohfut-ool-Mujahideen*." But he does not mention the name of the author of that work. His silence is rather remarkable.

The whole chapter of Ferishta does not exceed twelve pages.⁷ It gives a brief account of the introduction of Islām in Malabar, and the proceedings of the Portuguese there. A reading of this chapter inclines one to ask whether Ferishta could have summarised from Shaykh Zaynu'd-Dīn's work? It is generally understood that even the most rigorous summary of a long account must retain the essentials of the original. But in this case there is disparity between the two. The most conspicuous difference is, while the Shaykh's narrative stops with the year 1583 A.D., Ferishta's takes us to 1611 A.D. Besides, Ferishta's account contains references to the prevalence of Shāfism in Malabar, speaks of the Nāiṭ community, and mentions the grant by the Emperor Jahāngīr (1605-1627) to the English of a plot in Surat for the purpose of their building a factory. All these facts lead one to the view that the *Tuḥfat-al-Mujāhidīn*, from which Ferishta took extracts, might be the work of some one else, and not the book of Shaykh Zaynu'd-Dīn. The question has to be investigated further with great care.

The ancestors of Shaykh Zaynu'd-Dīn might have immigrated to Ma'bar from some part of the Islamic empire in the fifteenth century, for the Shaykh who wrote his book in the sixteenth century, was a descendant in the fifth degree of Aḥmad, who was the first to style himself as *al-Ma'barī*.

Shaykh Zaynu'd-Dīn is said to have written many books and commentaries, but definite information on these is not yet available. But it can be inferred from the present work that the Shaykh was genuinely pious, self-respecting and independent. His style

6. *History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India till the year 1612*. Translated from the original Persian of Mahomed Kasim Ferishta by John Briggs, Vol. IV.

7. Briggs' English Translation, Vol. IV, pp. 531-541.

is very simple and direct without rhetorical ornament, yet he is not free from the affectation of ornate style so common with most theologians who had steeped their minds in the *Qurān* and *Traditions*.

To these meagre particulars of *Shaykh* Zaynu'd-Dīn's life, it may be added that the *Shaykh* believed in pan-Islamism, for he not only incites the Muslim sultāns of the Deccan to action against the unbelievers, (Portuguese) by politely-worded remonstrance, but he has, with a glorious tribute, dedicated his work to 'Alī 'Adil Shāh, whom he considers as a zealous monarch, hearty and persistent in his endeavour to propagate the Faith, and root out the enemies of Islām.

A few words may probably be expected here on the English translation of the *Tuhfat-al-Mujāhidīn* by Lieut. M. J. Rowlandson, Persian interpreter to the Head-quarters of the army, Madras. It is clear the Lieutenant did the English translation about a century ago under conditions that were different from what we know to-day. Yet he brought out an admirable publication. Perhaps the critic who is disposed to scrutinize it closely will feel the need for a fresh English rendering from the original Arabic in the form as it is now offered to the public; also he will not be reluctant to admit the fact that considerable progress has been made in the present publication in regard to the identification of numerous names of persons and places that occur in the book.

Before concluding it must be mentioned that the *Tuhfat-al-Mujāhidīn* gives scope for research on many points. The details furnished by the book on a number of leading events, have to be examined carefully whether they could stand the testimony of authenticated works published since the days of *Shaykh* Zaynu'd-Dīn. The introduction of Islām in the west coast, the conversion of one of the Hindu kings of Malabar to Islām, the various activities of the Portuguese in Southern India in the sixteenth century and such other information could not but evoke the interest of historians. While the particulars about seaports in the Indian peninsula attract geographers, the words like *Malibār*, *Ma'bar*, *Marakār* and *Sāmūrī* will not fail to rouse up philologists. It is hoped that the subject matter contained in the book, will, by provoking criticism and stimulating research, serve to advance and extend our knowledge.

PREFACE

9

In conclusion, it gives me great pleasure to express my thanks to my affectionate friend Mr. M. Abdul Haq, M.A., D.Phil (Oxon), Professor of Arabic, and Principal, Government Muhammadan College, Mount Road, who has been good enough to carefully read with me all the pages of the translation and make helpful suggestions.

*University Buildings,
15th January, 1942.*

S. MUHAMMAD HUSAYN NAINAR.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

In the name of Allāh, the Beneficent and the Merciful.

Plentiful praise be to Allāh who made Islām victorious over all other faiths and enabled those who embraced it to gain mastery over others in successive ages. Blessings and peace be upon His prophet, the guide to the strong Faith, upon his family, his companions and his descendants till the Judgment Day.

Allāh, exalted be He, bestowed upon His servants discretion, conscience and wisdom as gifts, provided them amply with whatever they need, and showed them clearly what to do to obtain success in life. He sent unto His servants messengers to preach and admonish, to imbue them with knowledge of Allāh and to guide them.

Allāh conferred dignity upon us, Muslims, by bringing us within the fold of Muḥammad, the chosen, and thus exalted us over other nations.

Allāh, exalted be He, says :

“You are the best of peoples evolved for mankind.”¹

The Apostle of Allāh (peace be on him) said: “I am the Chief among the sons of Adam, and it is not a source of pride.”

As he is the Chief among the sons of Adam, he is the most excellent of all, and the exaltation of his nation is a consequence of his pre-eminence.

Imām Aḥmad relates on the authority of Miqdād that he heard the Prophet declare: “There shall not remain on the surface of the earth any house built of mud or of hair, but that Allāh will cause the *kalima* of Islām enter it either with the

1. Qurān, Sūra III, verse 110.

glory of the honoured, or with the baseness of the mean. Either Allāh will exalt them and bring them within its fold or demean them and make them submit to it." I say, the Faith, the whole of it is for Allāh.

Now it is a well-known fact that Allāh, glory be to Him and exalted be He, made the faith of Islām spread in most of the inhabited regions of the earth; in most countries by means of sword and force² and in some by exhortation to accept Islām. But Allāh has been gracious to the people of Malibār in Hind in making them accept the faith of Islām spontaneously and willingly, and not out of fear or compulsion. Their conversion happened as follows :

A party of the Muslims entered some of the seaports of Malibār and settled there. In course of time the inhabitants of these towns embraced the religion of Allāh. Thus Islām took root and its adherents increased in number. The towns in Malibār became populated with them, without their being oppressed by rulers who were unbelievers, or the rights of their ancient customs being encroached upon. Allāh vouchsafed to the Muslims large benefits and they passed many generations prosperously. Later on the Muslims disregarded the favours of Allāh. They sinned and set up feuds among themselves. So Allāh empowered over them the people of Purtukāl³ from among the *afranj* (may Allāh forsake them). They oppressed the Muslims, depraved them and manifested to them their hostility in countless ways of oppression and mischief, prevalent among the people of Malibār.

This continued for a space of time, extending to a period of about eighty years, till the condition of the Muslims had reached the worst consequences of decay, poverty, and humilia-

2. The accounts in history books do not testify to this statement by the author.

3. Zaynu'd-Dīn, the author of this book has two expressions *Purtukāl* to denote *Portugal*, and *Purtukāliyyīn* to indicate the *Portuguese*, or the *People of Portugal*. The present translator has retained *Purtukāl* and instead of *Purtukāliyyīn* has adopted the term *Portuguese* in the translation,

tion. They could neither devise any means nor find out a way for their deliverance. Nor did the Muslim sultāns and amīrs, (may Allāh exalt their allies) despite their possession of large armies and wealth, care to repel the misfortune and confusion that had befallen the Muslims by declaring holy war against the infidels and spending their wealth in the way of Allāh, for they had little interest in the affairs of their Faith and had preference of this transient world to the hereafter.

I, therefore, compiled this narrative with a view to inspire in the Faithful the desire of fighting the worshippers of the Cross; for a holy war with them is an obligatory duty, because they invaded the territories inhabited by the Muslims, and also captured from among them a multitude whose number cannot be counted. They slaughtered a great number of the Muslim captives and converted a number of them to Christianity. They kept the Muslim women under restraint, had commerce with them against their will and brought forth Christian children who, in due course, engaged themselves in waging war against the Faithful and afflicting them.

I named this book *Tuḥfat-al-Mujāhidīn fī ba'ẓi aḥwāl-al-Purtukāliyyīn*.⁴ I have narrated in it, the evil acts done by the Portuguese against the faith of Islām in the land of Malībār; a brief account of the laws relating to *jihād* and the greatest reward for it and an exhortation to do that duty by quotations from the Qurān and the *Traditions*⁵ together with a brief account of the strange customs pertaining to the unbelievers of Malībār.

4. The meaning of the title is:-

"A gratuitous gift to the holy warriors in respect of a brief account of the Portuguese."

5. During the life-time of Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him) it was the custom that when two Muslims met, one should ask for news (*ḥadīth*) and the other should relate a saying or anecdote of the Prophet. After his demise this custom continued and the name *ḥadīth*, which primarily denoted a narrative or a report, has come to mean, in the Islamic theological usage, the records of the sayings and doings of the Prophet, and is translated in English as the *Traditions*.

I have intended this as a gift-book to the most illustrious of sultāns, the most noble of monarchs, one who has made the holy war his chief consolation, and holds the elevation of the word of Allāh by military expeditions as a precious ornament. The set of his mind is towards service to the servants of Allāh. His lofty courage disposes him to destroy the enemies of Allāh. He is the reviver of the Faith, eradicating heresy and error from the territories of Allāh. His main purpose is to love the learned, and to help the strangers and the weak. He is a great ruler whom the days and nights have refined, notwithstanding his young age; he is the possessor of eternal glory, in spite of great jealousies of his enemies. The noble acts of his generosity have covered the whole of the earth, and the character of his good deeds has permeated through all the quarters of the universe. The necks of the mighty bow down before him; the nobles from among the Arabs and non-Arabs submit to his authority. He is a noble sovereign, whose palms shower rain of gems upon the learned who come from distant lands; a gentle king whose kindness elevates the dignity of the noble men who had preceded him. He is a ruler who meets with victory and success, and takes delight in pure and sincere deeds, and exploits which are recounted in all assemblies and towns, while the annals of his generosity spread in all climes. He endeavours to root out the heretics and to extirpate the wrong-doers. He spreads the banner of justice and mercy and stretches out his hand of benevolence and favour. Such is the mighty, victorious and compassionate Sultān 'Alī 'Adil Shāh.⁶

6. 'Alī 'Adil Shāh was the son of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh. He was the sultān of Bijāpūr between 1558 and 1580, and is known in history books as 'Alī 'Adil Shāh I. He was a *shī'a* and encouraged foreigners to enter the services in his government and regain their old position which they had lost during the life-time of his father. He always drifted into war, very often fighting with one or other of the sultāns of the Deccan. He once made an alliance with Rāmarāja of Vijayanagar. But when he found out that Rāmarāja was very overbearing, he formed a league with the other Muslim sultāns of the Deccan and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Hindu forces at Rakṣas Tangḍi and killed Rāmarāja on the field of battle in A.D. 1565. Very often he was at war with the Portuguese who made their profit out of the disturbances in the then political conditions of the Malabar coast and the Muslim kingdoms of the Deccan.

May Allāh exalt and strengthen the foundation of the Faith by means of his power. May he subdue the impious with his blaze and disperse their parties. May his kingdom extend over the east and the west; may he exercise his authority over land and sea and over the Arabs and non-Arabs; for, he is the leader to whose noble qualities the east and the west have given testimony, and in whose service men and genii are diligent. Love for men of knowledge and godliness is his innate nature; his exaltation of their ranks and respect to their sayings is as stated in the Law. May Allāh grant perpetuity to his kindness and justice in the universe and enable him to pour on the people of the world his generosity and benevolence with the help of Muḥammad and his posterity.

I have divided the work into four chapters.

FIRST CHAPTER

The laws relating to *jihād* against unbelievers, the reward that awaits those who may engage in it, and an exhortation to *jihād*.

SECOND CHAPTER

The appearance of Islām in the land of Malibār.

THIRD CHAPTER

A brief account of certain strange customs pertaining to the people of Malibār.

FOURTH CHAPTER

The arrival of the Portuguese in the land of Malibār and some of their shameful acts there. This chapter is again divided into fourteen sections.

Section 1

The early coming of the Portuguese into Malibār, the hostility that arose between them and the Muslims and the Sāmuri, the peace between the Portuguese and the rulers of Kashī and

Kannanūr, building of forts at Kashī, Kannanūr, and Kūlam by the Portuguese and lastly their seizure of the town of Kūwa.

Section 2

A brief account of their detestable deeds.

Section 3

A treaty of peace between the Sāmūrī and the Portuguese, and their erecting a fort at Kālikūt.

Section 4

The hostilities between them and the Sāmūrī and the capture of their fort by the Sāmūrī.

Section 5

The conclusion of peace between them and the Sāmūrī for the second time, and their building a fort at Shāliyāt.

Section 6

The third treaty entered into between the Portuguese and the Sāmūrī.

Section 7

The negotiations of Sultān Bahādur Shāh, son of Muẓaffar Shāh of Jazrāt, with the Portuguese which necessitated his handing over to them all his principal ports.

Section 8

The arrival of Sulaymān Bāshā, the *wazīr* of the late mighty sultān, Sultān Sulaymān Shāh of Rūm to Dēw and the adjoining regions and his return to Miṣr (Egypt) without any success.

Section 9

The fourth treaty of peace concluded between the Sāmūrī, and the Portuguese.

Section 10

The enmity between the Sāmūrī and the Portuguese.

Section 11

The treaty between the Portuguese and the Sāmūrī for the fifth time.

Section 12

The reasons for the hostility between the Sāmūrī and the Portuguese and the expeditions of corvettes to make war with them.

Section 13

The capture of the fort of Shāliyāt. May Allāh help Islām and the Muslims and exalt their Faith in the name of Muḥammad and his posterity.

Section 14

The condition of the Portuguese after the capture of the fort; their great desire to corrupt the religion of Islām and to abase the Muslims.

FIRST CHAPTER

THE LAWS CONCERNING WITH HOLY WAR AGAINST UNBELIEVERS, THE REWARD, AN EXHORTATION TO SUCH WAR

Know then : There are two sets of unbelievers. One is the group that permanently dwells in their countries. War against them does not become an imperative duty on the part of all the Muslims. If some from among them go forth to war against the unbelievers it will suffice, and the rest are released from the duty. Otherwise all become accused of having committed the sin. The other set of unbelievers are those who invade the territories of the Muslims, as is the case in our narrative. The war against such unbelievers is an obligatory duty imposed upon every Muslim, who is strong to undertake it whether he be a slave or female, of the city, or a dependent, without the permission of the chief, the husband, or the creditor. It is also binding on him who is not entitled to *qaṣr* in prayer. But it will be incumbent on those entitled to *qaṣr* in prayer if the number of the fighting force is not sufficient.

If the Amīr invites his companions for the holy war against unbelievers, it is necessary that he should consult his companions regarding the affairs of the war, and should arrange the ranks. And if he succeeds in coming by some booty, he must first cause it to be collected and then distribute it by giving the spoils of the slain to the slayer. The booty comprises all that is on the body of the unbeliever, namely, his clothes, boots, girdle, purse and what it contains in cash, bracelets, weapons of war besides his beast for riding, saddle and bridle. The leader shall then cause to make an equal division of these into five shares. Of these one is again to be divided into five portions. Of these five portions, one shall be set apart for the common good of the Muslims, like the fortification of frontier, erection of fortresses, bridges and mosques, and for the payment of allowance to *qāḏīs* and *imāms*. The second portion shall be given to the relatives of

the Prophet, the descendants of Hāshim and Muṭṭalib,¹ the third to be divided among the orphans, the fourth among the indigent and among those who are reduced to poverty, and the fifth is to be given to wayfarers.

1. Hāshim, the great-grandfather of the Prophet Muḥammad, was the son of 'Abdu-Manāf. He was a man of great consequence as well as riches among the Quraysh. He was the receiver of the tax imposed on the Qurayshites by Kossay for the support of the pilgrims, and the income derived from their contributions joined to his own resources, was employed in providing food to the strangers who congregated at Makka during the season of the pilgrimage.

Like the majority of the people of Makka, Hāshim was engaged in commerce. It was he who founded among the Qurayshites the custom of sending out regularly from Makka two caravans, one in winter to Yemen, and the other in summer to Syria. Hāshim died in the course of one of his expeditions to Syria, in the city of Ghazza about the year 510 A.D.

'Abdu'l-Muṭṭalib was the only son of Hāshim, by an Yathribite lady of the name of Salma. His original name was Shayba. Muṭṭalib, the brother of Hāshim, brought Shayba, the white-haired youth, from Yathrib to Makka. Mistaking Shayba for a slave of Muṭṭalib, the people of Makka called him 'Abdu'l-Muṭṭalib and history recognises the grandfather of the Prophet under no other name than that of 'Abdu'l-Muṭṭalib, 'the slave of Muṭṭalib'.

After the death of Muṭṭalib at Kazwān, in Yemen, towards the end of 520 A.D. 'Abdu'l-Muṭṭalib succeeded him as the head of the Commonwealth of Makka.

'Abdu'l-Muṭṭalib had ten sons and six daughters. Of the sons (1) Hārith, born towards 538 A.D. was the eldest. The others were (2) 'Abdu'l-'Uzza, alias Abū Lahab, (3) Abdu-Manāf better known as Abū Ṭālib (died in 620 A.D.), (4) Zubayr, (5) 'Abdullāh (545 A.D.), born of Fātima, daughter of 'Amr; (6) Dhīrār; (7) 'Abbās (566-652) born of Nutayla; (8) Mukawwim; (9) Jahm; and (10) Hamza, born of Hāla.

The daughters were Atika, Omayma, Arwa, Barra, and Umm-i-Hakīm, by Fātima; and Safiya, born of Hāla, who married Awwam, the grandfather of the famous 'Abdullāh ibn Zubayr, who played such an important part in the history of Islām.

It is also said that 'Abdu'l-Muṭṭalib had twelve sons. But the names of the two sons, other than the sons mentioned above, are not known, probably because they left no posterity.

The four other main shares that remain shall belong to the captors, namely, those who were present all the time of battle and engaged in it.

It should be the practice of those who fight against unbelievers that they must, before commencing the war, supplicate to Allāh for success; they should be pious and religious reposing trust in Allāh, exalted be He. Allāh helps to succeed in an undertaking. Every one of these warriors must also guard himself against perfidy in the division of spoils. There is a great threat of punishment for the perfidious.

It is well-known that the Muslims of Malibār have no Amir who possesses power and can exercise authority over them and be mindful of their welfare. On the contrary, all of them are subjects of rulers who are unbelievers. Notwithstanding this fact, the Muslims engaged themselves in hostilities against the unbelievers (the Portuguese) and spent their wealth to the extent of their means with the assistance of that friend of the Muslims, the Sāmuri,² who also expended money on their behalf from the begin-

2. He is the Zamorin of Calicut. The origin and early history of the Zamorins of Calicut are shrouded in mystery. We do not hear of the Zamorin before the days of 'Abdu'l-Razzāq (1442-43). The political condition of Malabar before the commencement of the sixteenth century presents an interesting study. The whole country between Cannanore and Cape Comorin consisted of a number of petty principalities under princelings who were very often waging war against one another. The principal rulers in the area were the king of Cannanore, the Zamorin or the king of Calicut and the Tiruvīdi or the king of Vēnāḍ, to whom the smaller rulers paid allegiance. They were entitled to wear the crown, issue coins and use the ceremonial umbrella. The Zamorin was a Nāyar by caste. Though his authority was questioned by the Rāja of Valluvanāḍ prior to the thirteenth century, he became later the most important ruler on the west coast wielding much influence and power. When the Portuguese came to India, the Zamorin was very powerful as compared with the Rāja of Cochin.

The origin of the word Sāmuri has been a puzzle to scholars. Some consider it to be a word derived from Persian or Arabic, while some consider that it is derived from the contracted compound of the Sanskrit Svāmi and Tirumalpād. (K. V. Krishna Ayyar, *The Zamorins of Calicut*,

ning. In course of time the Muslims grew weak owing to the depression of their trade, loss of their lives and devastation of their homes and property. This happened a number of times. Consequently their weakness increased, their poverty and destitution became intense, and they became powerless.

The Muslim sultāns and amīrs (may Allāh exalt their allies) never cared to take any interest in the affairs of the Muslims of Malibār, although *jihād* was an obligatory duty upon them. Whoever from among the sultāns shall wage war against the unbelievers by spending wealth and providing suitable equipments, shall resist the enemies, drive them away from the land of Malibār, and take back the ports which they have obtained possession of and brought under their rule, such one shall be well fitted for the task, and he will be the happy ruler; for he has performed, by the help of Allāh, what was obligatory on him, and has absolved others from the obligation, thus obtaining for himself a great reward, the extent of which cannot be conceived, and winning high praise from the people of the east and the west which cannot be gauged, and the satisfaction of Allāh, His angels, prophets and apostles. He has also acquired for himself the benefits of the benedictions of the righteous from among the servants of Allāh, the weak, the poor and the indigent. In addition to the reward for his action against the unbelievers and his spending money in the way of Allāh, he gets the reward for cheering up those who were feeling weak. The Prophet said :

“Whoever cheers up a Muslim in distress in this world, Allāh will dispel his grief on the Day of Judgment.” Muslim relates this *ḥadīth*.

If, therefore, such a recompense awaits a Muslim for relieving another Muslim from one single grief in this world, however trifling, how much greater shall be the reward for him who dispels the

pp. 13-15). But it is more probable that it is the shortened form of the title *Samudragirirāja* meaning lord of hills and waves. The Zamorin had also another title *Kunnalkkōnatiri* meaning king of hills and waves. These names indicate the important position the Zamorin held on the west coast.

grief of a large number of those who are weak, by fighting in the way of Allāh. Surely the reward for such a service cannot be reckoned by any one except Allāh—glory be to him, and exalted be He.

Verily Allāh, glory be to Him and exalted be He, has urged on *jihād* for the liberation of those who are weak. Allāh says :
 “And why should you not fight in the cause of Allāh and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated and oppressed, men, women, and children, whose cry is: ‘Our Lord! rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors, and raise for us from Thee one who will protect; and raise for us from Thee one who will help’.”³

Besides this, there are many other verses of the Qurān and a number of Traditions, relating to the merits of *jihād*, and expeditions therein, of spending wealth in that cause, and of martyrdom.

Verily Allāh, glory be to Him and exalted be He, has said :

“Fighting is prescribed for you and you dislike it; but it is possible that you dislike a thing which is good for you, and that you love a thing which is bad for you. But Allāh knows, while you know not.”⁴

“Allāh has purchased of the believers their persons and their goods; for theirs in return is the garden of paradise. They fight in His cause, and slay, and are slain: a promise binding on Him in Truth through the Law, the Gospel and the Qurān; and who is more faithful to his covenant than Allāh? Then rejoice in the bargain which you have concluded and that is the mighty achievement.”⁵

“The parable of those who spend their substance in the way of Allāh is that of a grain of corn: it grows seven ears and each ear has a hundred grains. Allāh gives manifold increase to whom He pleases and Allāh cares for all and He knows all things.”⁶

3. Qurān, Sura IV, verse 75.

4. *Ibid.*, Sura II, verse 216.

5. *Ibid.*, Sura IX, verse 111.

6. *Ibid.*, Sura II, verse 261.

"Think not of those who are slain in Allāh's way as dead; nay, they live finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord. They rejoice in the bounty provided by Allāh. And with regard to those left behind, who have not yet joined them in their bliss, the martyrs glory in the fact that on them is no fear, nor have they cause to grieve."⁷

Bukhārī and Muslim relate in their books *al-Sahīh*⁸ on the

7. Qurān, *Sura* III, verses 169-170.

8. As the problems of the early community of Islām became more complex, it was usual in theological circles to imagine what the practice (*Sunna*) of the Prophet would have been under each new set of circumstances and pass their judgment into circulation as a tradition (*ḥadīth*) emanating from the Prophet himself. These judgments swayed by the conflicting views of sects and parties were naturally often in open contradiction. As there were no written records or compilations of the *ḥadīth*, the students of the Tradition faced with the necessity of discriminating between them, fixed their attention first on the authenticity of the chain of authorities (*isnād*) by which the tradition was supported. They held that every tradition must be guaranteed by some reliable person as having been received by him from some other reliable person who himself had heard it from an earlier traditionist and so on back to a contemporary of the Prophet who vouched for having heard the Prophet saying the words or seen him doing the action related therein. In the nature of it the chain of authorities (*isnād*) could as easily be forged as a tradition; and so, for two centuries every movement in Islām attempted to gain support for its action by putting into the mouth of the Prophet utterances in favour of its views.

In these circumstances it became imperative to establish a corpus of traditions which could be accepted as genuine. The traditionists who insisted on the *isnād* criterion, eventually came to a general agreement that only certain chains of transmission could be regarded as authoritative. It was on these principles Abū 'Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il al-Bukhārī and Abū'l Ḥusayn ibn al-Ḥajjāj Muslim selected their traditions out of a mass of several hundred thousand and gave the name *Ṣaḥīḥ* (Sound) to their collections.

Abū 'Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il al-Bukhārī was born at Bukhārā on 21st July, 810 A.D., of an Iranian family. When he was sixteen, he went on a pilgrimage to Makka, and took this opportunity to attend lectures given by teachers of the tradition at Makka and Madīna. He then went to Egypt, and travelled with the same object all over Muslim Asia, spending five whole years at Baṣra. After an absence of sixteen years

authority of Abū Hurayra:⁹ "The Apostle of God was asked: 'Which action is the most excellent?' He said, 'Faith in Allāh and in His Prophet.'"

'What is next to it' was the question.

The Prophet said 'Jihād in the way of Allāh.'

'What next?' was again the question. He replied, 'A pious pilgrimage¹⁰ to Makka.'

in all, he returned to Bukhārā, and there he compiled his *Ṣaḥīḥ*. He died on 30th August, 870 A.D.

Abu'l-Husayn ibn al-Ḥajjāj Muslim was born at Nishāpur in Khurāsān in 817 A.D. He went to the Ḥijāz, 'Irāq, Syria and Egypt in order to search out Traditions. He also paid several visits to Baghdād. He is said to have collected more than three hundred thousand traditions, on which his selection is based. The matter of Muslim's book, like that contained in Bukhārī's (with which it is identical, except for the addition of more authorities) is arranged in the order adopted for legal subjects, but without any chapter headings. It is also remarkable for its introduction, wherein the author treats of the science of the traditions in a general and complete manner.

The *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim have become two canonical books of Islām. They may be considered to sum up the science of tradition in the third century of the *Hijra*. Four other works complete the six canonical books to which Muslims pay great respect. They were all produced during the same period. These are the *Sunan* of Abū Da'ūd, the *Jāmi'* of Abū 'Isā Muḥammad al-Tirmidhī, the *Sunan* of Abū 'Abdu'l-Raḥmān Aḥmad al-Nasā'ī, and the *Sunan* of Abū 'Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Māja.

9. He is one of the most constant companions of Prophet Muḥammad. As a result of this intimacy he has related more traditions in regard to the sayings and doings of the Prophet than any other individual. He died when he was seventy-eight years of age, in 59 A.H.

10. Pilgrimage (Ḥajj. lit. *setting out*). In the technical sense it means: to set out for visiting the Baytullāh (House of Allāh) in Makka. The pilgrimage to Makka is performed in the month of *DHū'l-ḥijja*, the twelfth month of the Muslim year. The *hajj* is the fifth pillar of the religion of Islām. It is an incumbent religious duty founded upon express injunctions of the Qurān. This duty is incumbent on every Muslim, once in his life time, if he be an adult, free, sane, healthy and has sufficient money for the expenses of the journey and for the support of his family during his absence.

It is also related on the authority of Abū Hurayra that the Prophet said: "Allāh urges on him who goes forth in His cause that he should not set out unless with firm faith in Me and belief in My prophet. It may be that He may cause him to return with what He has given him of wages or booty, or that He may cause him to enter paradise."

Abū Hurayra says that he heard the Prophet declare: "I swear by Him in Whose hands is my being, that as there is not one among the Faithful willing to remain behind me in the city, holding his life dear,—and I do not find any way to constrain him to that course of action—I have to lag behind the body of troops fighting in the way of Allāh. I swear by Him in whose hands is my life, that I desire to die in the way of Allāh, then to be brought back to life, then to be slain, then to be brought back to life, and then to be slain."

Abū Hurayra further says that the Prophet has declared:

"He who goes forth to fight in the way of Allāh is like one who observes continuously fasting, stands to prayer and is obedient to the commands of Allāh, till he returns from his service in the way of Allāh."

"No one who fights in the way of Allāh is wounded, but that Allāh knows better about him who is wounded in His cause, that he shall appear on the Day of Judgment and the blood that flows from his wound shall be of a red colour like blood, but its odour will be as that of musk."

Anas relates that the Prophet has declared: "Service in the way of Allāh in the morning and evening is better than this world and all that is contained in it."

"There is no one among those who entered the paradise, who would desire to come back to the world. What thing is there on earth that the martyr could desire to return to the world? His hope in returning to the world may be for this: that his life might be sacrificed ten times. This is because he appreciates the glory of it."

Jābir relates: "A man said to the Prophet at the time of the battle of Uḥud:¹¹ 'Suppose I am killed at the battle, where would I be?' He answered: 'In the paradise.' On hearing this the warrior threw away the date fruits he had in his hands, rushed to the battle field and fought till he was slain."

Sahl ibn Sa'd relates that the Prophet has declared: "Engagement for one day in the way of Allāh is better than the world and all that it contains."

Abū Mūsā relates: "A man came to the Prophet and asked him: 'Which of the following three is in the way of Allāh, doing his duty: the man who wages war to obtain plunder, the man who fights for the sake of glory, or the man who goes forth to find his rank among the warriors'? The Prophet answered, 'He who fights for the glorification of the Word of Allāh, is in the way of Allāh'."

Abū Sa'id al-Khudrī relates: "The Prophet said: 'Of all mankind the *mu'min* is the best who fights in the way of Allāh and sacrifices readily his life and wealth.'"

Bukhārī records on the authority of Abū Hurayra: "The Prophet declared: 'In paradise there are a hundred dignities which Allāh has prepared for those who fight in His cause. The difference between one rank and the other is as wide as the space between the heaven and the earth. When Allāh shall enquire of you, which rank you desire ask for *Firdaws*, for, it is in the centre of the paradise, and most grand. Above it, is the throne of the All-Compassionate Lord, and from it the rivers of paradise spring'."

Abū 'Abs relates that the Prophet has declared: "The fire of hell shall not afflict the man whose feet are covered with dust in the service of Allāh."

11. It is a hill about three miles distant from Madīna. It is celebrated for a battle fought by the Prophet, when the Muslim army was routed by the Quraysh under Abū Sufyān, in 625 A.D.

Abū Qays says: "I heard Sa'd relate thus: He said: 'I was the first man among the Arabs who shot with the arrows in the way of Allāh. We were fighting and the Prophet was also one of our company. We had no food except the leaves of the trees. Every one of the party actually ate the leaves and we were excreting as the camel and goat ; nevertheless we suffered no harm'."

Abū Hurayra relates that the Prophet has declared: "He who shall engage his horse in the way of Allāh with faith in Him and belief in His promise, verily the food and drink of the horse, its ordure and its urine shall be placed on the scales for his advantage on the Day of Judgment."

Muslim records on the authority of Abū Hurayra, that the Prophet has declared:

"He who shall die without ever having fought in the way of Allāh and whose mind had no presentiment of it, surely he dies with the charge of hypocrisy against him."

"The unbeliever and the slayer shall never come together in hell."

"The most remarkable man is he who bridles his horse in the way of Allāh and rides fast on its back whenever he hears any uproar or noise flying as it were, desiring battle and having death for his goal, or one who is in regular work of breeding his flocks and herds on the top of the hill or in the bosom of valleys, and keeps to prayer, pays the poor rate and thus continues to worship his Lord till his death. Such men will be successful."

Jābir ibn Samura relates: "The Prophet declared: 'This religion will continue to exist and a band of Muslims shall fight in its cause till the Judgment Day.'"

Salmān, the Persian, relates that he heard the Prophet declare: "Preparations for war for a day and a night in the way of Allāh are better than fasting for a month and praying all night."

If the person dies in the course of his preparation, the work for which he applied himself becomes executed. He will be granted his sustenance, and is safe from the mischief-maker."

'Uqba ibn 'Amr relates: "I heard the Prophet express thus from the pulpit: 'Prepare for them whatever you can. Look: *The strength lies in archery. The strength lies in archery. Surely the strength lies in archery.*'"

"I heard the Prophet declare: 'He who learnt the art of archery and then abandoned it, cannot be counted as one of our number!'"

Abū Mas'ūd al-Anṣārī relates: "A man came to the Prophet with a bridled she-camel and said: 'This is dedicated to service in the cause of Allāh.' The Prophet replied: 'Unto thee shall be given on the day of resurrection seven hundred camels, all of them bridled.'"

Masrūq relates: "We asked 'Abdullāh ibn Mas'ūd about the following verse of the Qurān: 'Think not of those who are slain in the way of Allāh as dead, nay, they are finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord. They rejoice in the bounty provided by Allāh.' He replied: 'Indeed we did ask of the Prophet about that verse, and he answered: 'Their souls are in the bellies of green birds. They have lamps suspended from the *'arsh*. They go about in paradise, wherever they please. Then they flock together near the lamps, when their Lord appears and asks them: 'Are you in need of anything?' They reply: 'How can we be in need of anything? We go about the paradise wherever we choose.' The Lord puts them the same question three times. And when they perceive that they ought not to have left Him without asking a favour, they pray saying: 'O! Lord! we wish that our souls may be returned to their bodies so that we may once again be slain in your way.' When Allāh understood that there was no more desire to be fulfilled, He left them'."

'Abdullāh ibn 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ reports: "The Prophet said: 'Fight in the way of Allāh conceals everything except the Faith.'"

Anas relates: "The Prophet and his companions went forth till they met at Badr¹² the infidels who came to attack them. The Prophet said: 'Rise ye to paradise, the width of which is the expanse of both the heaven and the earth put together.' 'Umayr ibn al-Ḥamām then cried out, 'Bravo! Bravo!' The Prophet questioned him, 'What makes you shout like that? He replied: 'Nothing, By Allāh O! Prophet of Allāh, it is nothing but the hope of my being one of the inhabitants of paradise.' The Prophet then said: 'Verily, behold, thou art already one among them.' Then 'Umayr ibn al Ḥamām took out from his quiver the date fruits which he was eating and observed: 'By Allāh! if I have life till I eat these dates, that period would seem to be one of long life.' Then he threw them all out, and fought the enemy till he was slain."

Tirmidhī and Abū Dā'ūd relate on the authority of Fuḏālat ibn 'Ubayd: "The Prophet of Allāh said: 'Every man who dies sets a seal to his work except the one who dies fighting in the way of Allāh. His works continue to grow till the Judgment Day, and he is safe from confusion in the grave.'"

Abū Dā'ūd relates on the authority of Abū Umāma: "The Prophet of Allāh said: 'He who did not fight, or equip a *ghāzī* or did not make provision for the *ghāzī*'s family in his absence, will have his Day of clamour even before the Day of Judgment.'"

12. The battle of Badr was fought between the Muslims and the Quraysh in January 624 A.D. A force consisting of a thousand well-equipped men under the noted Abū Jahl, 'the Father of Ignorance' marched out from Makka to relieve a rich caravan. The Muslims received timely notice of the movement, and a body of three hundred disciples proceeded at once to forestall the heathens by occupying the valley of Badr, upon which the Quraysh, under Abū Jahl, were moving. A battle ensued. The Quraysh fought bravely. At one time the fortunes of the field wavered, but Muḥammad's appeal to his people decided the fate of the battle. The Quraysh were driven back with great loss; many of their chiefs were slain; and Abū Jahl also fell a victim. But the importance of the Prophet's success cannot be measured by the material damage which he inflicted. Considering the momentous issues involved, Badr, like Marathon, or Plassey is one of the greatest and most memorable battles in all history. The victory of Badr turned all eyes upon Muḥammad. He became a power in Arabia.

'Imrān ibn Ḥuṣayn relates: "The Prophet said: 'There shall always be a party of my followers who will fight for truth and resist those who rise against them, until the time when they shall, last of all, destroy the Antichrist.'¹³"

Tirmidhī relates on the authority Ibn 'Abbās: "The Prophet said: 'The fire in hell cannot touch two kinds of eyes; the eyes that weep in dread of Allāh's displeasure and the eyes that are busy watching for an opportunity in the way of Allāh.'"

Abū Hurayra relates: "One of the Companions¹⁴ of the Prophet passed by a path in a mountain where he came across a small sweet water spring. He was fascinated by it, and said, 'I wish to abandon my people and take up my dwelling here.' When this was reported to the Prophet, he said: 'You shall not do this, for the dignity of everyone of you who goes out to fight in the way of Allāh, is more meritorious than of one who says prayer in his house for seventy years. Don't you think that God would forgive you and admit you in paradise? Fight in the way of Allāh. He who fights during the space of time when milk collects in the udder between the two milkings of a she-camel, paradise is necessarily reserved for him'."

Tirmidhī and Nasā'ī relate on the authority of Abū Hurayra: "The Prophet said: 'The martyr does not experience the pangs of death except as the pain caused by a wound.'"

13. He is called in the Traditions as *al-Masīhu'l-Dajjāl*. It is said that he would appear before the day of Resurrection.

14. *Aṣḥāb*, plural of *Ṣaḥīb*, the Companions or Associates of Muḥammad. The term, used for a single Companion, is *ṣaḥāba*. There is considerable controversy as to who is to be regarded a *Companion*, and what elements make up this definition. Strictly speaking the term 'Companionship', in relation to the Prophet, can be attributed only to those personalities from among the earliest Muslims who were on intimate terms with him and shared his daily life, and, in varying degrees, also to his thoughts; that is to those who could be called *friends* in the *deepest meaning* of the word. But Muslim historians and theologians, have, from the third century of the *Hijra* onward, begun to enlarge this term in a manner to include in it every person, who while being a Muslim, saw the Prophet even without nearer association.

Khuraym ibn Fātik relates : "The Prophet said : 'He who spends in the way of Allāh, it shall be written down for him seven hundred fold'."

Ibn Māja relates on the authority of 'Alī, Abū Dardā', Abū Hurayra, Abū Umāma, 'Abdullāh ibn 'Amr, Jābir ibn 'Abdullāh, and 'Imrān ibn Ḥusayn : "The Prophet said : 'He who contributes to expenses in the way of Allāh, and remains himself at home, for every *dirham* he has expended, he shall receive seven hundred fold. He who goes forth to war in the way of Allāh, and at the same time spends money in that cause, will get for every *dirham* seven lakhs of *dirham*'." Then the Prophet recited the following verse from the Qurān : ".....Allāh gives manifold increase to whom He pleases : And Allāh cares for all and He knows all things."¹⁵

Abū Dā'ūd relates on the authority of Ibn 'Abbās : "The Prophet said to his companions : 'When your brethren were slain at the battle of Uḥud, Allāh put their souls into the bellies of green birds. They roam about the rivers in paradise; they eat of its fruits, and retire near the lamps of gold, suspended in the shadow of His *'arsh*. When they found out the sweetness of their food and drink and the pleasantness of their resting place, they said : 'Who shall carry the intelligence to our brethren that we are alive in paradise so that they may not shun paradise, and be frightened away from war. Allāh, glory be to Him, and exalted be He, replied : 'I will convey this news for your sake.' Thus Allāh revealed the verse, "Think not of those who are slain in Allāh's way as dead ; nay, they live....'."

Hākim relates on the authority of Abū Mūsā al-Ash'ari : "The Prophet said : 'The paradise is underneath the shadows of the swords'."

Ibn Māja relates on the authority of Anas : "The Prophet said : 'He who goes forth to war in the way of Allāh, the dust

which collected on him shall be changed into musk on the Day of Judgment.'"

Ṭabrānī has recorded in his book *al-Kabīr* on the authority of Ibn 'Umar: "The Prophet said: 'He who breaks his head in the way of Allāh, whatever may be the sin committed by him before that, shall be pardoned.'"

Wā'ila relates: "The Prophet said: 'He who missed the opportunity to accompany me to war will fight on sea'."

Dārimī relates in *Musnad*¹⁶ on the authority of Abū Hurayra:

"The Prophet said: 'To engage for a while in the way of Allāh, is better than to make fifteen pilgrimages.'"

It is meant thereby that the reward for engaging in the holy war for a while, is far greater than the reward for fifteen pilgrimages. The reason for this pre-eminence is that the holy warrior risks his life and wealth for the sake of Allāh, and bestows benefit on others as well, which cannot be said to be the case with the pilgrim.

16. This is a book of traditions compiled by 'Abdullāh ibn 'Abdu'l-Raḥmān al-Dārimī of Samarqand, who died in 869 A.D. This does not contain more than a third of the matter of six *Ṣaḥīḥ*, embrace, and is drawn up for practical use, in which the traditions are arranged in the order of the most immediate witnesses. It has been lithographed at Cawnpore, N. India.

SECOND CHAPTER

THE FIRST APPEARANCE OF ISLAM IN MALIBAR

It happened thus: A party of Jews and Christians, with their family in a big ship, entered one of the sea ports of Malibār, named Kodungallūr¹ where its king resided. They secured from the king grants of lands, gardens, and houses and settled there.

Some years later, there arrived at Kodungallūr, a party of Muslim *faqīrs* with a *shaykh*, intent on a pilgrimage to the Foot-print² of our Father Ādam in Silān. When the king heard about

1. Kodungallūr is the same as modern Cranganore. The Jews are said to have first settled there. The Jews came to the East after the destruction of their temple at Jerusalem in A.D. 68. It is said that a Jew named Joseph Rabban received the principality of Añjuvannam from Bhāskara Ravi Varman the ruler of Cranganore. The date of this ruler is not definitely known; perhaps he flourished in the first half of the eighth century A.D.

2. The Adam's Peak in Ceylon is one of the loftiest and the best known in the world. It is 7260 feet in height, rising in solitary grandeur on the western front of the great central plateau and could be seen by navigators miles away on the sea.

It is a great pilgrim centre to peoples of all nationalities. On its summit is a lofty black rock with a hollow depression about four feet long resembling a big human foot-print. The Singhalese, Siamese, Burmese and Tibetans claim that it is the foot-print of the Buddha and call it his Śrī pāda. The Hindus venerate it as the mark of Śiva's foot. The Muslims consider that it is the foot-print of Adam, who, according to them, having been sent out of Paradise, stood on one foot on the peak for centuries doing penance. The Christians however claim it to be that of St. Thomas. The result is a never ending concourse of pilgrims to it from different countries.

There are two ways which lead to the peak. One is a straight narrow track along the precipices, the last portion of which is so steep that chains have been fixed at some places for the safety of pilgrims. The other is a circuitous road, considered less sacred.

Over the sacred foot print has been constructed a small chapel by the Buddhists to whom all offerings go, whether made by members of their own faith, or Hindus or Muslims.

the Duke of Argyll had been replaced, not by Sir Stafford Northcote, but by Lord Salisbury, who at once adopted the views contained in it, and lost no time in instructing the Indian Government to give them effect.

His orders filled the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, and his Council with consternation ; and, first fortifying themselves with asking and receiving the concurrence of "all the men most experienced in border matters," they strove earnestly to induce the Indian Secretary to reverse his decision. A little delay was all they succeeded in obtaining ; and when, by the resignation of Lord Northbrook in January 1876, Lord Salisbury had the opportunity of appointing a Viceroy to his mind, the policy recommended by General Jacob, Sir H. Green, and Sir Bartle Frere, triumphed over that which had been upheld by four Viceroys—Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook ; by two Commanders-in-Chief in India—Sir William Mansfield (afterwards Lord Sandhurst), and Lord Napier of Magdala ;¹ by two Military Members of Council—Sir Henry Durand

¹ The latter officer changed his opinions after leaving India, so far as to favour the occupation of Quetta.

and Sir Henry Norman; by two Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab—Donald McLeod and R. H. Davies; by one Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces—Sir William Muir; by two Commissioners of Peshawar—Sir R. Pollock and Donald McNabb; by A. Monro, Commissioner of the Derajat Division; by R. Taylor, Commissioner of Umritsur, and by many others hardly less well acquainted with North-West Frontier affairs than the majority of the men whose names I have given above.

Quetta was occupied within six months of Lord Lytton's arrival in Calcutta; but that step, which was at no time likely to embroil us with Afghanistan, however much the Afghans might dislike it, was so overshadowed by the interest attaching to the efforts made to carry out Sir B. Frere's second recommendation, that, beyond contributing its share to the work of impressing Shere Ali with our hostile intentions towards him, it cannot be said to have exercised any influence on the course of events which led swiftly and surely up to the second Afghan War. That war lasted two years, and out of it the Indian Empire emerged in the possession of the Pishin and

Kuram valleys—the latter of which had proved to offer none of the military and political advantages with which Lumsden had succeeded in investing it in Lord Lytton's eyes—but no nearer the object for which the war had been waged, the right, namely, to place British officers in the Afghan frontier towns ; and with so little satisfaction in the results obtained that, except during the first years of Lord Ripon's Viceroyalty, all the men who have since been concerned with the Government of India, have been kept in a state of miserable unrest, between the incessant demands of the military authorities for more annexations to enable them to seize and hold that ideal frontier which still recedes as they advance ; and the anxious remonstrances of successive finance ministers, distracted with the difficulty of finding the means to meet the ever-increasing drain on a treasury which it was at no time easy to fill ; to say nothing of the warning of Civil administrators who have had to deal with the discontent which that drain has evoked among all classes of the people.

CHAPTER II

INDIA'S NEW FRONTIER—ITS GARRISONS AND ITS APPROACHES

IT was not without good reason that, at the risk of wearying my readers, I made in the preceding chapter so careful an examination of the Minutes of Lord Lawrence, and the Memoranda of Sir William Mansfield, Sir Henry Durand, and Sir Henry Norman. My object was to show that these illustrious statesmen and soldiers not only condemned the particular aims which the partisans of the "forward" policy were pursuing in those days, but that they foresaw the lengths to which that policy would carry the British and Indian Governments, and met, in advance, the arguments by which its later developments would be supported. It is the fashion to speak slightly of the opinions held by these men, as narrow, short-

sighted, timid, and, at best, of temporary application ; but those who will take the trouble to study the great State-papers in which they were expounded, will be likely to agree with me that they had all the width which comes from regarding a subject from every point of view ; all the far-sightedness which an intimate knowledge of the past can give ; all the courage which springs from a calm conviction of strength adequate to meet danger, should danger arise, and all the permanence which results from basing judgments on principles and expectations on an acquaintance with human nature. Opinions resting on such foundations are not liable to change with change of circumstance, as Lord Roberts' views have changed, and might change again, were he, a second time, to be brought face to face with the practical consequences of the policy which now seems to him so entirely above cavil and beyond dispute.

No one who read the letter in which he made excuses for the men who held erroneous views on frontier policy thirty years ago, could guess that within half that period of time he himself had shared those opinions, and that his bold and

strong advocacy of them had no inconsiderable share in determining the frontier policy of the years immediately following the termination of the Afghan War of 1878-80. That policy was one of retrogression on all the three lines by which British armies had entered Afghanistan on the 21st November, 1878.¹ A popular government was organized in the Kuram Valley, which was then evacuated. On the Khyber side all regular troops were withdrawn, though we kept our hold on this route, as far as Lundi Kotal, by means of subsidized Afridi levies. On the Kandahar side that city was handed over to the new Amir, Abdur Rahman ; and although the Pishin Valley was retained as an assigned district,² the railway line leading up to it from Sibi was abandoned by the orders of Lord Hartington, then Secretary of

¹ Sir F. Roberts counselled complete retirement from the Kuram and the Khyber, the two routes with which, at the time of writing his Memorandum of May 29, 1880, he was acquainted, and the retention of the Kandahar line, of which he then had had no experience.

² An assigned district is one of which we collect the revenues, paying over any surplus there may be, after the expenses of administration have been defrayed, to the prince from whom we hold it.

State for India, and the rails, so far, as they had already been laid, pulled up.

The position thus created remained unchanged till the so-called Penjdeh incident, in 1885, provoked an outbreak of Russophobia so strong and enduring that it swept away all the military, political, and financial considerations which, for a time, had held the "forward" school of politicians in check, and has not expended its force up to the present hour. Under the strong initiative of Sir F. Roberts, the new Commander-in-Chief in India, feverish activity began to reign all along India's north-west border. The construction of the railway from Sibi to Pishin was resumed, and the line opened in 1887. / The Khwaja Amran range of mountains, the western limit of the Pishin district, was pierced by a great tunnel, and a strong post in advance, to cover the western mouth of that work, was established at New Chaman, in Afghan territory, notwithstanding the vigorous protests of the Amir. The railway was pushed forward through this tunnel, and large quantities of rail, destined some day to connect New Chaman with Kandahar, were collected and stored at the former place. / At the same time engineers were

busy constructing a great military road between the Indus and Pishin, *viâ* the Borai Valley and the fortified lines at Quetta were being largely extended. /

/ These measures could not be taken without arousing the fear and suspicion of the inhabitants of the territories through which roads and railways were being carried. Fear and suspicion culminated from time to time in open opposition; open opposition had to be crushed by military expeditions, after each of which a portion of the force remained behind to overawe discontent and carry out the policy of bringing the whole country lying between the Amir's dominions and those of Great Britain, under British influence. /

In this way our troops spread laterally through the Kakar Hills and down the Zhob Valley, as well as advancing beyond the Khwaja Amran range. The occupation of so much fresh territory necessitated a large increase in the size of the force that had hitherto sufficed to garrison Quetta and the Pishin Valley. This necessity was met in the first instance by drawing on the reserve of 10,753 European and 8,334 native soldiers which had been provided, whilst Sir Donald Stewart was yet

Commander-in-Chief, as an insurance, against the risk that, at some future day, additional troops might be needed and not be forthcoming.¹ In 1887-88, however, a further addition of 10,886 natives was made to the established strength of the army in India, thus bringing up the total increase to 29,973, a figure which corresponds almost accurately with the estimate made by Sir Henry Norman and accepted by Sir William Mansfield of the minimum number of men that would have to be added to the Anglo-Indian army, should the views of Jacob and Green ever prevail over those of which they themselves were the champions, whilst the manner in which these political occupations were carried out was just that insidious creeping over the country, "like a mist,"² no particular notice of our proceedings being taken either within India or beyond it,³ which Green had recommended and Sir William Mansfield had denounced as dis-

¹ Sir Auckland Colvin in *Nineteenth Century*, October, 1894.

² Minutes of Sir William Mansfield in Papers relating to Central Asia and Quetta.

³ Sir H. Green's "Suggestions for the Protection of the North-West Frontier of India."

honouring to British policy. Certainly, few people, either in England or in India, have, to this day, any conception of the fact that on this portion of the north-west frontier alone, about 43,500 square miles have been added to the British Empire within the last fifteen years, by far the greater part of which since 1885.

Whilst on the south-west of our long borderline British troops were stealing towards Kandahar and silently diffusing themselves through the territories of the Duranis, Achikzais, Kakars, Musakhels, Luni Pathans, Khetrans, Bozdars, Zmaris, &c., at its north-eastern extremity the Kashmir Imperial Service Troops and the Escort of the British Resident at Gilgit had begun the same process of bringing hitherto independent tribes under the political authority of Great Britain. Hard fighting ensued, with heavy losses on both sides, and, as the magnitude of the task undertaken became apparent, the occupying force had to be strengthened by the addition of a regiment of Pioncers, a wing of a Sikh regiment, and a number of British officers, withdrawn from already under-officered native regiments in India, whilst an enormous outlay was incurred, not once

and for all, but year by year, in making and maintaining roads, and in provisioning these distant and, in winter, inaccessible outposts.

Simultaneously with the growth of our responsibilities on and beyond the Kashmir frontier, the Kuram Valley, which had been abandoned in 1881 as a worthless possession, was re-occupied, and is now held up to the Peiwar Kotal.

Last year, having previously bought the consent of the Amir of Afghanistan to our dealing as we might please with all the independent tribes still remaining between his territories and ours, a Delimitation Commission, with a very large escort, was sent up into the hills of Waziristan to determine our new political frontier. The inhabitants, enraged at the intrusion of several thousand British troops into their territories, and not at all inclined to acquiesce in an arrangement to which they had not been parties, fell upon the camp of the boundary commissioner in the night, and very nearly overwhelmed its defenders. To avenge this attack and to punish some raids into the Zhob Valley, in one of which a British sergeant had been killed, an expedition, under General Lockhart, was despatched last winter into Waziristan,

which, after some fighting and much loss of life among our troops from sickness,¹ reduced the country to submission, by the ordinary methods followed in such cases, viz., the blowing up of towers, and the seizure of cattle and grain,² after which the work of delimitation was continued, and that of constructing roads and establishing fortified posts begun.

Up to the present time this was the last fruit of the "forward" policy, but now another is ripe for plucking.

•/As the agreement with the Amir of Afghanistan extended to the tribes inhabiting Swat, Bajaur, and Chitral, as well as to the Waziris, the latter State, commanding, as it does, routes into Afghanistan, India, and Kashmir, became the next object of the "forward" party's desire. An excuse for occupying it was soon provided by the simple, but costly expedient of sending a British officer

¹ According to General Lockhart's Despatch of May, 1895, 171 deaths in four months from pneumonia alone.

² On the 8th of January, one column captured 3,500, and on the 17th of the same month 1,600 head of cattle, besides large quantities of grain and bhoosa. (*Times of India*, of January 12th and 26th.)

with a small escort, on a temporary mission to Chitral, allowing him to remain on there after the purpose for which he had been sent had been accomplished, and then when, at last, his safety had been endangered by an outbreak of the civil strife usually raging in that country, by despatching an army to his rescue.

In this instance, however, the magnitude of the operations required, and the enormous cost, have interfered with the realization of the hopes which inspired them. /Public attention has been so powerfully attracted towards Chitral that it has become impossible to apply to that State the policy of insidious advance/ which had been previously so successful in saddling India with territory which she did not covet, and England with responsibilities of the nature and extent of which she was ignorant. \In the former country, native and European newspapers alike protested against the fresh drain on its waning resources ; and in the latter, old Indian statesmen and soldiers of experience and distinction¹ raised their voices

Sir Neville Chamberlain, Lord Chelmsford, Sir John Adye, Sir James Lyall, Sir Auckland Colvin, and Sir Lepel Griffin.

loudly against the foolish and short-sighted policy which, for lack of steady public opposition, had come to be regarded as necessary and inevitable.

Lord Rosebery's Government had decided to withdraw from Chitral, and had sent orders to that effect ; now the question is again under consideration, but it is hard to believe that an administration in which the Duke of Devonshire holds a prominent place, will look with favour on its permanent occupation ; since to him was due the retirement behind the Khwaja Amran range, and the stoppage of unremunerative military works ; and there is no reason to believe that he has changed his opinion as to the best way of assuring the safety of the British Indian Empire since, in 1881, he gave such striking proofs of his distrust of the methods recommended by the school of politicians, which clamoured then for the retention of Kandahar, as it clamours to-day for the retention of Chitral. Still, it is unwise to trust to the influence of a single man, with colleagues whose views on this point, at least, have always been opposed to his own ; and therefore the necessity for impressing the truth about the military situation on our Indian North-West

Frontier on the public mind, is more urgent and vital to-day than it was before the change of Ministry ; all the more urgent and vital because, with the occupation of Chitral, the last "buffer" between India and Afghanistan would be swept away, and the next struggle between the two opposing Indian frontier policies will be over the question of the annexation of Afghanistan itself.

I have shown how our frontier has been gradually extended westward and northward, till it embraces territories containing about 76,500 square miles, inhabited by tribes whose fighting strength is estimated by Lord Roberts to be little short of a quarter of a million of men, let us now see how this enormous area is held and defended.

In the Quetta district, which extends from Khelat on the west to the Gomul river on the east, a distance, as the crow flies, of 280 miles, and from Sibi on the south to New Chaman on the north, a distance of 130 miles, and which contains about 43,500 square miles, there are less than 9,000 troops of all ranks and arms, and 24 guns, of whom 3,500 men and 18 guns are detailed for the

¹ The above passage was written before the British Government's decision had been announced.

defence of Quetta itself. Three points—New Chaman, which covers the western mouth of the Khojak tunnel, Loralai, which protects the military road between Dera Ghazi Khan and Pishin, and Fort Sandeman, in the centre of the Zhob Valley—absorb three regiments of infantry, a regiment of cavalry and the six remaining guns; and the rest of the force is divided among 13 posts, lying from 30 to 50 miles apart, the detachments consisting sometimes of a mere handful of infantry and cavalry, as at Moghal Kote, near the confluence of the Zhob and Gomal rivers, on the border of Waziristan, and at Mir Ali Khel, some 40 miles from Moghal Kote, and its nearest support.

Now of all these posts I venture to assert that not one is held in anything like adequate strength. What would be the fate of the tiny detachments in the Kakar Hills and the Zhob Valley if those regions were ever to witness such a sudden rising of the tribes as surged round General Roberts' little army in December, 1879? In such a storm, Loralai and Fort Sandeman might be able to hold their own, on condition that, like the rising referred to, that storm proved as short as it was violent; but supposing the Russians, having occupied

Herat, were to begin moving on Kandahar? A prudent commander, whether his orders were to forestall the enemy in the occupation of the latter city or to remain quietly at Quetta awaiting reinforcements and watching events, would at once call in all his scattered forces to strengthen his own weak position—for what are 3,500 men as a garrison for the long lines of that great fortress?—and to spare himself the necessity of having to send out relief expeditions, in every direction, to extricate beleaguered detachments from imminent peril. But why maintain, in time of peace, at great expense, a number of weak outposts, which would be abandoned at the first prospect of war? Concentration, not dissemination, is the military watch-word in the face of danger, and it would be just as well to begin where we shall have to end, especially as the maintenance of these strategically worthless posts keeps a number of powerful and warlike tribes in a chronic state of exasperation, without in any way consolidating our authority over them. As a matter of fact, though tranquillity may prevail, our troops, not only in the Quetta district, but throughout the whole of the territories lying between India's

administrative and political frontiers, are all encamped in an enemy's country, where their position exactly resembles that so graphically described by Jacob as existing in Sind when he assumed command of the frontier of Beluchistan. "The troops at Khanghar (now Jacobabad), Shalpur, and other posts," so he wrote, "were shut up within walls and cantonments, completely isolated from the country-folk. The troops were fed, both man and horse, as if on ship-board, by the Commissariat Department. Provisions, even ~~to~~ forage for the cavalry horses, were stored for the various fortified posts at enormous cost to the State. ¹ Everything was as in a state of siege."

Unfortunately there is this difference between the situation in Sind half a century ago, and that in the Kakar Hills, or Waziristan, or at Gilgit to-day, that the latter regions do not lend themselves to the measures by which Jacob soon changed the aspect of affairs in the former province. There can be no "pulling down of forts as impertinent to cavalry and peculiarly improper for Oriental border warfare, in which moral force is of such mighty power"; no rapid and unexpected scouring

¹ Views and Opinions of General John Jacob.

of the country from end to end, because cavalry are practically useless among mountains, where even infantry have to manœuvre with the greatest circumspection, and, unless covered by fortifications, are liable to surprise; neither can there be any gradual weaning of the people from their warlike habits by the substitution of useful employment, for predatory raids as a way of adding to their scanty means of subsistence. Where Jacob made canals, or induced the villagers to make them for themselves and to take pride in their work, our commanders, beyond the administrative frontier, can do nothing but construct military roads—often by forced labour, always for the more complete subjugation of the inhabitants of the districts through which they run—along every yard of which springs up a fresh crop of sullen resentment and fierce discontent. It is this fact, that our presence in these barren intractable wastes can do nothing to convert them into fruitful fields, that constitutes the worst and most hopeless feature of the situation. There can be no question of attaching the people to *our* interests when we can do nothing to further *theirs*; and as the peace, which we impose upon them, does not bear its

proverbial fruit—prosperity, and does deprive them of their chief delight—fighting and plundering, there seems every probability that, to the end of the chapter, we shall stand before them in the hateful light of conquerors and policemen, and need to be always on our guard against isolated attacks and combined insurrection. The latter contingency is most likely to occur in connection with one of two possible events—an advance of Russia into Afghanistan, or a rebellion against British rule in India itself, and both the advance and the rebellion are, year by year, being rendered more probable by the policy designed to hold the former State in check and to minister to the security of the latter.

In my former book I gave my reasons for believing that a Russian invasion of India on any serious scale is an impossible thing ; but a forward movement on Russia's part, which would shake our present unstable military position to its foundations, may easily come to be within her wishes and her power. The temptation to take advantage of the extremely dangerous situation in which our troops beyond the border have been placed, and to profit by the hatred which our occupation of their

mountains has awakened in the breasts of many thousands of armed men, is so strong and so constant that it will be strange if she does not yield to it some day.

Russian money and Russian officers, even without the co-operation of a Russian army, would go far to overcome that lack of cohesion between the different tribes in which we have hitherto found our security; and the number of Russian troops that would be required to make the destruction of our weak garrisons a certainty might be so small that, if their advance were connived at by the ruler of Afghanistan, it could be made with what, in that part of the world, would be considered ease and rapidity.

In the Quetta district alone is Russia likely to take *direct* hostile action against us, but in all the other occupied districts she might work against us *indirectly* through their inhabitants, and in each the military situation is thoroughly unsound. In Waziristan about 6,000 square miles are held by 2,500 men and six guns,¹ in the Kuram Valley,

¹ It has recently been announced that the Tochi Delimitation Escort, consisting of one cavalry regiment, one mountain battery, one company of sappers and miners, and four

which Lord Roberts, in 1880, declared "could probably never do with a less" force than that which then occupied it, viz., 5,313 infantry, 829 cavalry, and 19 guns; there are now 950 men and three guns; on the Samana range of mountains, between Kuram and Kohat, forty miles from the latter place, on which they depend for support, hemmed in by the Zymukhts on the south, and by the Orakzais on the north, are several weak posts, furnished by one regiment of native infantry;¹ in the Gilgit district, the wildest and most inaccessible of all our new acquisitions, comprising about 23,000 square miles, there are 3,200 men and six

regiments of infantry, are, owing to the restlessness of its tribes, to remain temporarily in Waziristan; but these troops do not efficiently support the garrison of Wano, as the two places are separated from each other by the whole length of Waziristan, one of the most rugged and difficult countries in the world.

¹ In 1891, after the first Miranzai Expedition, the regiment which was employed in constructing these posts was driven from the Samana Heights by the Orakzais, and it took ten days to collect a sufficient force at Kohat to retake the position. If this was the case within forty miles of our original frontier, how great might be the difficulty of giving timely aid to the numerous posts scattered over our new territories, hundreds of miles from that frontier.

guns; and in one and all of these territories the Indian authorities are trusting to good luck for the safety of the meagre garrisons and their necessary complement of defenceless camp-followers. Not only is the occupying force in each inadequate to meet a serious emergency, and serious emergencies may arise at any moment, not only are the troops in one district unable to come to the assistance of their comrades in any of the others, but the rear-communications of all are imperfect and precarious. To the ordinary Englishman, who for years past has heard with pride and satisfaction of the wonderful roads and railways which our Engineers have been busy constructing beyond India's administrative frontier, this may seem a hard saying; but those who have followed the story of these stupendous works must be well aware of its truth.

To connect Quetta with Sibi no less than three railways have been undertaken since 1880, one up the Bolan Pass direct to Quetta, a second up the Hurnai Valley to Bostan in Pishin, twenty-one miles in advance of Quetta, and united to it by a branch line; and the third *viâ* the Mushkaf Valley.

The science and skill of our Engineers have been equal to the making of each of the three ; they have pierced mountains with tunnels—long and short—on the Mushkaf line nineteen in a distance of fifty-nine miles ; they have thrown bridges of every kind and span, across rivers and ravines—forty-seven on the aforementioned line ; they have carried their rails up steep inclines, along lofty embankments, round sharp curves ;—in a word, they have vindicated man's power to subdue Nature, so far as the planning and executing of these great works is concerned ; but when it has come to *maintaining* what they have made, Nature has proved herself stronger than they. On the direct Bolan line she long since won the day, and man retired discomfited before her ; on the Sind-Pishin line, where the battle is still being waged, the victory will soon be hers.

Year after year, on this section of the North-Western Railway, he has reconstructed, altered, repaired, and she has swept away, undermined, and overwhelmed. In 1893 nine new bridges had to be erected to replace others which the floods of 1892 had destroyed.¹ That year much labour was

¹ Administrative Report of the Indian Railways, 1893-94.

expended on training the river near Mudgorge "so as to minimize the erosion of the toes of the slips," and "on improving the drainage of the threatened localities," and yet on the 26th of February, 1894, at this very Mudgorge, after several days of continuous rain, the land slipped away about fifty feet from under the sleepers and rails, leaving them suspended in mid-air for a long length, "so that the rails which had already been put down eight times would require now to be laid for the ninth time"; and "other minor slips had wrecked the line completely for about 800 feet." At Khanai, beyond Mudgorge, the raging torrent had burst the bunds which confined its waters and scoured away the railway embankment. All goods traffic had to be stopped, and the three special trains which were to have taken the Middlesex Regiment to Bombay, postponed indefinitely; in fact the first train was returned to Quetta from Khanai, and it was not till March 11th that the line was sufficiently restored for the movement of the troops to proceed, although even then they had to be transhipped at Mudgorge.¹— Things were no better on the stretch of line north

¹ *Times of India*, March 6, 1894.

of the Bostan Junction. Between Syed Hamed and Gulistan the track was dangerous owing to the abnormal rush of water, whilst the Khojak tunnel itself was leaking badly, the masonry with which it is lined, proving ineffectual in preventing the water, which percolates through the hill, from pouring down on the roofs of the carriages as the trains travelled through.¹

Earlier in February there had been heavy snowfalls between Dirgi and Fuller's Camp, interrupting the traffic on several occasions ; and on the 12th March an enormous slip occurred in the shale cutting just above Puddle Hollow, which covered up with debris 600 feet of line, and crumpled up two crib bridges.² At the end of June, in consequence of the bursting of two bunds above Sukkur, the Indus wrecked the Sibi line near Ruk,³ nearly two miles of it being under water. Early in July other bunds were breached, and some portion or other of the line continued to be carried away daily, resulting in serious interruptions to traffic ; and whilst this was going on at

¹ *Ibid.*

² Administrative Report.

³ *Times of India*, August 31, 1894.

one end of the line, at the other end, the western mouth of the Khojak tunnel had been blocked, "so that through running could not be restored for some days, and there had been new slips near Mudgorge by which traffic had also been interrupted."

According to the latest Administrative Report on the Railways in India, the damage done by floods to the trans-Indus military railways during the official year 1894-95 was no less than that suffered by them in 1893-94. On the 2nd July a great bund was breached south of Sukkur, and, to save the line from destruction, a large opening 800 feet wide had to be made in its embankment between Ruk and Shikarpur, and notwithstanding this precaution it was three feet deep in water from mile 319 to mile 326. More outlets were made, but it was not until the 30th August that loaded wagons could be hand-shunted across, and it was some days later before an engine could safely pass over the line. On the 22nd of the same month other parts of this railway were breached by floods, and on these portions traffic was not resumed until 15th August. On the 24th July the three heavy training spurs in Mudgorge were clean swept away, and the river returned to

its old channel close under the cliff to work more mischief to the Sibi-Pishin line. The great Khojak tunnel suffered too from similar causes. On the 15th July an exceptionally heavy storm—the storms in these parts are apparently always exceptionally severe—broke over the Khwaja Amran mountains, and the cutting at the Chaman end of the tunnel was filled up by the debris, which it took a full month to clear away.

As in spring and summer, so in autumn and winter ; indeed, according to a correspondent of the *Times of India*, writing on October 1st, 1893, “the sectional heads of the North-Western Railway look grave whenever a shower of rain comes down.” But the best commentary on the condition of the Hurnai Valley Line is to be found in the fact that, though it has been in existence only eight years, yet another is being constructed to take its place. The correspondent of the *Times of India* from whose letter I have just quoted boldly pronounces the new railway altogether beyond the pale of floods, except between Herokh, at mile 503, and Doyan, where, in a distance of four miles there are “nine bridges, all built specially strong to battle against possible floods, which

rush down with terrific force." But on turning to the Administrative Report already quoted from, I find that between mile 474½ and 486½ extensive training works were being carried out, "the talus across which the line is located being very steep in places, and the floods moving enormous masses of gravel and boulders which, unless properly regulated, will overwhelm the works." The Report also mentions the fact that on the first division of this railway, stretching from Sibi northwards for twenty-five miles, seven out of eight tunnels were in treacherous ground; and the *Times of India* speaks of great cracks having shown themselves in some of the completed tunnels, and of their mouths being blocked by masses of fallen debris.¹ All this goes

¹ The Mushkaf-Bolan line was to have been ready this summer, but its opening has been put off till next year. I have been unable to ascertain how far this delay has been caused by difficulty in carrying out the original works, and how far by injury to the portions already completed. It is, I believe, intended as an alternative line to Quetta; in practice, I think, it will simply take the place of the Hurnai Valley Railway, because the cost of maintaining two lines will be too great to be faced, and the Hurnai Railway, as probably the less durable and the longer, and certainly the less satisfactory from a military point of view, as the loss of Bostan Junction would deprive us of the command of it, is the more likely to be abandoned.

to dissipate the hope that the Mushkaf-Bolan line will enjoy complete immunity from the natural dangers from which the Sind-Pishin line has suffered ; whilst it will share with the latter the liability to frequent interruptions of traffic between the Indus and Jacobabad, and between Quetta and New Chaman, and, owing to the large number of tunnels and bridges by which it is distinguished, it is specially open to injury by human agency.

One cause of possible catastrophe to which both are alike subject I have not yet mentioned, I refer to ~~earthquakes, which occur in all parts of~~ Afghanistan and the adjacent territories, and are often of great violence. Mr. McGeorge,¹ describing one which occurred in the Quetta district in the winter of 1892, mentions that in the Khojak tunnel the noise was deafening ; that workmen engaged on the roofing were thrown from their perches to the ground, and that afterwards the engineers discovered, to their surprise, that the earth's crust had contracted $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet in the vicinity of the tunnel works. "One shrinks," he writes, "from thinking what the effect on the Khojak

¹ "Ways and Works in India."

tunnel would have been had it come within the destructive action of the shock."¹

Even, then, if the Mushkaf-Bolan line proves more stable than that which it is to supersede, it cannot ensure to our troops in the Quetta district absolutely firm communications with their base in India, and, unfortunately, the roads leading up to and through that district are just as likely to be interrupted by natural causes as the railways, though, owing to their greater simplicity of construction, less open to be wrecked by men ; whilst the fact that the Indian Military Authorities have come to depend upon the railways for the movement of troops and supplies, in this particular region, has made them more careless of ordinary

¹ The best known illustration of the degree to which Afghanistan is subject to earthquakes, and the influence which they may exercise upon warlike operations, was afforded by what occurred during the siege of Jellalabad in 1841, when one side of the defences so laboriously constructed by the British garrison was levelled to the ground in a single hour, and our troops owed their escape from destruction to the accident that the besiegers failed to discover the breach till it had been partially repaired. Many minor shocks followed, and for weeks Sale's force did little else but repair by day what had been destroyed by night.

means of transport,¹ so that it would be a work of time to fall back upon the Bolan road should the Bolan railway fail us; nor is the military road from Dera Ghazi Khan to Pishin any safer against earthquakes, floods, and hostile tribesmen, whilst, on account of the greater altitude which it attains in parts, it is in more peril of being closed by snow in winter.²

Turning to the other occupied territories we

¹ Even in the Chitral Expedition the Transport Service has been the weak point; and yet, inadequate as it has proved, it was only obtained by depriving the Cavalry regiments over a large part of India, even some of those of the Bombay Presidency, of their baggage mules.

² A line, about 300 miles long, to start from Dera Ishmael Khan, traverse the Zhob Valley, pierce the Kakar Hills, and eventually join the Sibi-Pishin section of the North-Western Railway, has seriously been projected by the Indian Government, though financial reasons have hitherto interfered with its construction. This line will not be connected with the Indian system of railways, because there is no bridge over the Indus at Dera Ishmael Khan, nor any likelihood of one ever being built, and, except for military purposes, it will be entirely useless, as the country through which it will run produces nothing which it can export, and the Central Asian trade will be more than provided for by the maintenance, in efficient working order, of the existing railway from New Chaman to Sukkur, or of the line which is to take its place.

find the same natural conditions prevailing in one and all. In Waziristan road-making is only in its infancy as yet ; but, looking to the character of the country, it is safe to predict that any roads which may be constructed will suffer from the same vicissitudes as those in the Quetta command, and that railways, should they ever be undertaken, would prove no more stable than the Sind-Pishin line. The roads leading to the Kuram Forts, especially that on the left bank of the river, are much exposed to flank attacks from the war-like tribes inhabiting the difficult ranges of hills by which the valley is shut in, whilst that on the right bank is often cut by heavy floods, and, as I showed in "Can Russia Invade India?" the road leading from the Kuram Forts to Kabul, to command which is the only reason for occupying the Kuram at all, crosses a pass so high, that it would be folly to throw troops beyond it, unless sure of being able to meet their requirements in winter by the Khyber route, in which case there would be nothing gained by making use of the more circuitous and difficult line of advance.

The nature of the road upon which the Gilgit garrison has to depend, not only for reinforcements

but for food, forage, and military stores, is so well known that it will suffice to say here that it traverses mountains so high and precipitous, swept by winds of such exceptional bitterness, and visited by snow storms of such violence and duration, that the work of reinforcing and provisioning has to be carried on within very narrow limits, and within these, at a terrible cost of human and animal life.

Yet another point has to be considered before the danger, present and prospective, of the military situation on the North-West Frontier can be fully understood—that point, the constitution of its defending force.

It will be remembered that Lawrence and Mansfield and Norman all deprecated the employment of regiments containing Pathans, or other northern hillmen in the countries beyond our border.¹ With their usual strong common-sense and intimate

¹ The great majority of the Independent Tribes are Afghans. We call them Pathans, as though that was the name of another race, but Major H. G. Raverty, the best authority on the subject, says all Afghans call themselves Pushtanah as well as Afghans, and that there is no more difference between an Afghan, a Pushtun, or a Patan, than between a Grecian, a Greek, or a man of Greece.

knowledge of human nature, they recognized that it was too much to expect military fidelity to outweigh family affection and tribal ties, and they predicted that if we attempted to hold newly-conquered regions by means of their own inhabitants, we should some day be overwhelmed by a catastrophe greater than that of the Indian Mutiny.

On this point they were in full accord with General John Jacob, who was quite innocent of all intention of carrying out his scheme for the better protection of India, by the hands of Afghans or Beluchis, and would not suffer a single man of either nationality in the splendid force with which he kept the peace in Sind, even through the dark days of the great Mutiny. "Every Brahooee (Belooch of Khelat), so he wrote, "whom we enlist is certainly either a thief, a coward, or a traitor, or is, very probably, all three combined Were I proceeding on service against the tribes bordering on our frontier I should consider the real strength of my force to be increased by the absence of such soldiers. They could not be trusted without imminent risk of failure and disgrace Those Afghans, &c., are utterly faithless, and we can never feel a just confidence that they will be

true in the hour of need . . . This practice (that of enlisting such men) is fraught with extreme danger, for in case of service against the tribes beyond our border—the brethren of those people—we should assuredly have in our ranks as many spies and traitors as we had Brahooees.”

The catastrophe predicted by Lawrence and his military advisers has not yet happened ; but in the Afghan War there were numerous indications that the elements out of which it may spring were present in our native army ; numerous confirmations of the wisdom of Jacob's practice in the matter of recruiting. On General Roberts' night march to the Spingawi Kotal, and the subsequent assault on the Afghan “ sungas,” the Pathan companies of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry showed themselves quite untrustworthy ; and on all the lines of advance, desertions were frequent, and the enemy were kept thoroughly well-informed as to our plans and movements. Similar attestations to the truth of the warnings which we continue to despise, have not been wanting in more recent days ; the attack on the camp of the Delimitation Commissioner at Wano, for instance, was led by deserters ; and that there were traitors within that camp was conclusively

proved by the accurate acquaintance with our dispositions displayed by the Waziris. I fancy most officers who have served on the frontier will support me in saying that everywhere, and at all times, the Independent Tribes have our deserters in their ranks and their spies in ours ; and many will agree with me in thinking that the stealing of arms and ammunition which goes on merrily all along the border, is often carried out by deserters, or discharged soldiers, and connived at by men still in our service.

But setting aside the immediate danger from desertion and treachery, the mere fact that so many men of the tribes in whose territories we are encamped, are yearly passing through the ranks of the Indian Army adds enormously to the prospective insecurity of our tenure of power among them. Trained by us in military discipline and the knowledge of the tactics we employ, they are likely to prove far more formidable enemies in the future than they have been in the past, since they will only need the leaders, whom Russia can supply, to turn their vast numerical superiority over us to full account. And yet there are men among us who defend the "forward" policy by the argument that

we have in the territories of the Independent Tribes an inexhaustible recruiting ground, and that to abstain from occupying them ourselves would be to make a present to the Russians of their magnificent fighting strength!

Is it so hard to see that, so far as it is safe to employ Pathans in our army at all, the supply will always be equal to the demand, since soldiering is their natural avocation, which they will follow whether our posts are scattered over their lands or not; and that to fill our ranks with such men, whilst trenching on the independence of the tribes to which they belong, is indeed to risk making a present of their fighting strength to our rival, and that in the most unpleasant way possible?

I shall probably be told that my argument applies quite as much to India as to Waziristan, inasmuch as both are conquered countries which we hold in part by the swords of their own inhabitants; but the cases are not parallel, for in the one country the military element forms but an infinitesimal portion of the population, whereas in the other the military element is the whole people. In the one case we have an enormous mass of human beings to work upon, in a thousand different

ways, on whose natural love of peace and habitual submission to authority we can count, as a set-off to the possible disloyalty of certain individuals or classes, even if we cannot flatter ourselves that our rule is accepted from a conscious appreciation of the benefits it confers upon them; in the other case, we have nothing to work upon but a horde of semi-savage warriors, one of whose chief sources of gain, in their eyes a quite legitimate one, we are obliged to close to them, and who would lose nothing by our being driven out of their country to-morrow. It is *not* on the sword that our Empire in India really rests, but upon our administration, which, on the whole, keeps the bulk of the inhabitants passively content, and so we can afford to guard it by men taken from their midst—a due proportion between the number of British and Native troops being carefully observed.

And this reminds us that Sir Henry Norman placed that proportion for the Kingdom of Afghanistan, the country whose occupation was under discussion when he wrote, at one-third, and Sir William Mansfield at one-half, and leads us to ask what, in this respect, is the actual state of affairs in those newly-occupied territories which so closely

resemble Afghanistan in their natural features, and in the character of their peoples; and again the answer is not reassuring; the proportion of Native troops to British in Quetta being four and a half to one, whilst in Waziristan, the Kuram, and Gilgit, there is not a single British soldier. /

And there is yet one point which must be touched upon before we can feel that we have taken a comprehensive view of this branch of our subject: I refer to the fact that, with the exception of the Pathans and Beluchis, against whom the most experienced men of both schools of Indian politicians have agreed in warning us, our whole force beyond the border, European and Native alike, are living separated from their wives, with the consequence, to which it is folly to shut our eyes, that the cause which did so much to fan the flame of Afghan hatred of us in the first Afghan War, and was not absent from the minds of the fierce mob which destroyed Cavagnari and his escort, in the second, is ever present in our new possessions, and must be doing its natural work in embittering their people against us. for however immoral the Afghan may be in his own habits, he is as jealous

as other men of interference with his women by foreigners.¹

Not content with enlisting individual Beluchis and Pathans, the Indian military authorities have raised in Beluchistan, throughout the Quetta district and in the Kuram, a number of tribal levies, in other words, bodies of irregular troops, composed exclusively of men in whose lands we have established ourselves, led, not by English officers, but by their own chiefs, and on these treacherous and, at heart, inimical allies they are relying to make good the deficiency in the strength of the regular forces, which they are able to spare from their legitimate duty of preserving order in India itself.

Now, tribal levies have their uses, and are perfectly innocuous *so long as they are in advance of our position and in no way mixed up with our troops*, witness the services rendered ever since 1881 by the Khyber levies in keeping open that great trade route; but in the rear and on the flanks of an occupying army they are dangerous in the extreme, as was fully proved during the

¹ Norman alludes to this point, but only in relation to its effect on the morals of the British portion of the trans-frontier force.

late Afghan War, when those same Khyberis, whilst taking our subsidies and professing to assist in guarding our communications, were actually engaged in plundering our baggage and commissariat trains, and in cutting off camp followers and stragglers whenever the opportunity of doing so presented itself. The Afghan is what he was, and will act in the future as he acted in the past, which means that when the occasion arises to prepare for which we have summoned him to our aid, he will turn against us, without the slightest compunction, the arms, training, and knowledge of our weakness with which we have been insane enough to furnish him.

But since our new territories are barren of resources, inhabited by races whom it is not in our power to conciliate, approached by roads and railways on which no certain reliance can be placed, and garrisoned by troops whom it is in part unwise to trust and in part unwise to employ, supplemented by levies which are dangerous in exact proportion to their numbers and efficiency, it is clear that in them at least a "scientific" frontier has not been attained. We are, indeed, at certain

points beyond the screen of mountains 'which hid what was taking place in Central Asia from Jacob's eyes, but we are also far from the standpoint which accepted Quetta as a complete guarantee against Russian ambition ; and we are certainly much less able to meet Russian invasion with overwhelming numbers, should it ever be attempted, than in the days when the Indus was our line of defence, with Jacobabad as the "bastion of the front attack."¹ All the annexations of which I have told the story have been carried out, or profess to have been carried out, for the purpose of strengthening India against Russia, yet, with the exception of Quetta, there is, as I have already said, hardly a post throughout the enormous area covered by them which could play any part in a war between her and us ; nor would Quetta's own part be the all-decisive one attributed to that fortress by General Jacob, since, by the construction of the military road through the Borai Valley, it has ceased, for the purpose which the Russians would have in view, to be the salient which must be taken before anything can be attempted against us.² That purpose would be, *not* the invasion of

¹ General Jacob's Letter to Lord Canning.

² *Ibid.*

India, but the destruction of our forces *outside* that country, and the shock which such disaster would give our authority within it; and for the attainment of this end the masking of Quetta would be as possible as the masking of Jacobabad¹ in an advance on the Indus, would be impossible, *unless meantime we have ceased to play at occupation and have everywhere established ourselves in such force that Russia and the tribes combined would fail to shake our position.* The adoption of this course would, however, compel us to add another Army Corps to our Anglo-Indian Army, and so consummate India's financial ruin, or else to denude that country of troops, and, in so doing, to risk the loss of the kernel in clinging to its shell. I do not think that the politicians and

¹ It has been privately objected to me that Jacobabad is unfitted to play the part which I have assigned to it in my Scheme of Defence, on account of the great heat which prevails there in summer; but I gave, I think, conclusive reasons to show that no Russian invasion need be looked for at that season of the year (or, indeed, at any), and as it could be put in an efficient state of defence with the ample means at our disposal in the course of a few weeks, there would be no need to occupy it in force till it was quite certain that an invading army was about to start from Kandahar.

strategists of the "forward" school are prepared to accept either alternative, and I do not believe that they are deceived as to the nature of the frontier with which they have so far succeeded in endowing India. / They know as well as their opponents that it is hopelessly weak, practically and theoretically unscientific ; but its defects are, in their eyes, its merit, since they will furnish them some day with the arguments which they will use to induce the British Government to assent to a still further advance. / When the next wave of "Brevet-Mania" and "K.C.B.-Mania," coinciding with a fresh Russian scare, sweeps over the Anglo-Indian Army, it will be from *their* lips that we shall hear the plain, unvarnished truths which I have been labouring to impress upon my readers, but with a different application ; for the moral of these truths is, for me, "backwards," whilst, for them, it would be "forwards."

· / Forward into Afghanistan, with her consent if it can be obtained, without it, if it be withheld ; forward to Kandahar and Kabul ; forward to the Hindu Kush ; forward to the Oxus. Always and everywhere, there will be some obstacle concealing the movements of the enemy that must be

swept away/ some pass of which both ends must be held, some river of which both banks must be commanded, some nation which must be coerced into friendship /and, always and everywhere, the "scientific frontier" will elude their grasp and mock their hopes; not that it does not exist, but because they have turned th ir backs on it, and left it far behind; for what is a "scientific frontier"? Surely one which it is easy and cheap to defend and difficult and costly to attack; and no frontier in the world fulfils that definition more thoroughly than the frontier which satisfied Lawrence and Mansfield, Norman and Durand. /R..

One word in conclusion. Just as Jacob and Green protested that there was nothing in common between the measures they advocated and those which involved us in the first Afghan War, so supporters of the "forward policy" to-day are anxious to dissociate it from the same policy as it was understood before the second Afghan War. It is, so we are constantly being told, a new policy; but no one has attempted to show in what its originality consists. At the present moment it is being applied to the Independent Tribes only; but these came within the scope of Jacob's and Green's

schemes, were expressly named by Rawlinson as requiring to be considered even in the matter of the occupation of Quetta ; and, under the general term of Afghans, they and their territories were present to the minds of Sir John Lawrence and his Council, when protesting against each and every scheme for the advancing of our frontier. It professes to respect the independence of these tribes ; but similar professions accompanied our first and second advance into Afghanistan, and were not absent from the proposals which Lawrence and his advisers rejected. 'It claims to be conceived in the interests of Afghanistan as well as in those of India, but so did the policy of Lord Lytton.' It is loud in its protestations of humanity, of its desire for the well-being of the peoples it feels compelled to bring under British control ; but Lumsden's Note breathed the very spirit of Christian philanthropy, and our troops marched into the Khyber, the Kuram, and Khost, preceded by the proclamation of our kindness and goodwill.

No, the policy and its aims are quite unchanged ; the only difference lies in the slower and more systematic manner in which those aims are being sought. Instead of rushing through the territories

which divide India from Afghanistan proper—always the real object of the “forward” party’s ambitions, since there, and not in Waziristan, or the Kuram, or in Gilgit, lie the strategical points the possession of which will, they believe, place India’s security on a firm foundation—we are steadily reducing those tribes to submission and taking up a position from which we hope to be able to move rapidly on Kabul and Kandahar when the occasion for doing so shall present itself.

And certainly, in one way, that position is skilfully chosen ; for as, all along our immense border-line, the territories occupied by the lawless tribes under our influence, march with the territories inhabited by the lawless tribes over whom the Amir of Afghanistan exercises a partial and precarious authority, there will not be the least difficulty in picking a quarrel with him at any convenient moment ; and of that fact, notwithstanding his courteous reception of Sir Mortimer Durand, and the visit of his son to England, Abdur Rahman is undoubtedly fully aware ; and if he ceded to us without a struggle the right to keep the Independent Tribes in order, and thus to become at all points his own immediate neighbour,

it was probably because he saw that it would be as dangerous for him to refuse his consent to our doing what we had determined to do, as it had proved fatal to Shere Ali to resist our demand to be allowed to place British officers in his cities ; or, perhaps, because he thought that the Independent Tribes would keep our hands full during his life-time, and that he should be doing the best he could for his successor in getting out of us meantime as much money and as many arms as he could ; or, possibly, he may have hoped that we should find the work on which we were so eager to enter too much even for our resources, and that the wisdom thus painfully acquired would prove the best protection of his own country's independence ;—but, whatever his hopes and his calculations, he would be no Afghan if he did not suspect our motives, distrust our promises, and, above all, nourish, deep down in his heart, the firm resolve to leave no stone unturned to keep us out of his dominions, whether we seek to enter them as friends or foes ; for he knows that if we begin as the former we must end as the latter, inasmuch as the conditions under which campaigns have to be conducted in Afghanistan would soon

compel us to confiscate the food of its inhabitants, and no ruler who ever sat upon the throne of Kabul could keep a hungry people from taking up arms against their despoilers.

I shall offer no opinion as to whether, the policy of insidious advance being persisted in, the struggle between India and Afghanistan will come in the life-time of the present Amir, or be delayed till the intestine troubles which are pretty sure to follow his death, shall give a colourable pretext for the invasion of the latter country by the former ; but I do not hesitate to assert that we cannot stay indefinitely where we are, and that we shall inevitably, sooner or later, be drawn or driven on ; unless, whilst freedom of choice is still ours, we can find courage to renounce the "forward" school of politicians and all their works, and to accept once more the guidance of the great statesmen who sought to assure the permanence of our rule in India, by developing her resources and contenting her people. Backwards or Forwards?—that is the question which results from this brief survey of the past history and present aspect of the North-West Frontier problem, towards the wise answering of which I trust my third and last tract may contribute something.

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